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The 2011 MENA Revolutions: A 
Study in U.S. Energy (In)Security
Jessie Rumsey
Kent State University
Introduction
We will lay the foundation for our future capacity to meet America's 
energy needs from America's own resources.
—Richard Nixon, 1974
A massive program must be initiated to increase energy supply …to 
achieve the independence we want.
—Gerald Ford, 1975
Abstract
The recent upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have 
brought into stark relief the conflict between democratic values and stra-
tegic interests in U.S. foreign policy. Americans are known for commit-
ment to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, yet the U.S. 
Government is frequently unwilling to step forward and openly express 
even rhetorical support for reform movements in foreign countries. In 
fact, initial American reluctance to support the recent "Arab Spring" 
uprisings serves as another example of what scholars argue is a general 
exception in the MENA to broader post-Cold War rising costs of main-
taining autocracy. This article explores the American response to the 
recent MENA uprisings and their significance in terms of U.S. fossil fuel 
energy security using the theoretical lens of structural realist interna-
tional relations theory.
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This intolerable dependence on foreign oil threatens our economic inde-
pendence and the very security of our Nation.
—Jimmy Carter, 1979
We will continue supportive research leading to the development of new 
technologies and more independence of foreign oil.
—Ronald Reagan, 1981
There is no security for the United States in further dependence on 
foreign oil.
—George H.W. Bush, 1988
For decades we have known the days of cheap and easily accessible oil 
were numbered.
—Barack Obama, 20101
The recent upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have 
brought to light, once again, the conflict between traditional American 
values and the overarching goals of American foreign policy.2 Citizens of 
the United States are renowned for their commitment to universal liber-
ties, freedom from oppression, and human rights for all, yet the U.S. Gov-
ernment has been frequently unwilling to step forward and openly 
express even rhetorical support for reform movements in foreign coun-
tries. Why is this so? More specifically, why, even after the initial shock of 
having been caught off-guard by Tunisian and Egyptian reform move-
ments faded, did President Barack Obama appear so unwilling to express 
support for the revolutionaries in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) in early 2011? As the revolutions gained momentum, instead of 
expressing solidarity with the protestors, Obama's spokesman refused to 
be drawn on whether or not the administration continued to back Egyp-
tian President Hosni Mubarak. In an attempt to side-step the inquiry, he 
referred instead to the country of Egypt as a "strong ally"—from which 
many inferred that the United States continued to stand with the autocrat. 
Not until after Mubarak had already dissolved his government did Secre-
tary of State Clinton call for an "orderly transition" of power in Egypt. 
Meanwhile, President Obama waited until the eighth day of protests 
before urging a "meaningful" and "peaceful" power transition—by which 
point it was already evident that Mubarak had lost the battle for control of 
his country.3
In fact, this ambivalence is not a recent development. It is, though, a par-
ticularly salient example of what scholars argue is a general exception in 
the MENA to the post-Cold War phenomenon of rising costs being associ-
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ated with the maintenance of openly autocratic regimes.4 Authoritarian 
resilience specialists have successfully produced research demonstrating 
that Western support plays a role in maintaining the stability of authori-
tarian control in the Middle East and North Africa. This support takes the 
form of both material resources and international legitimacy.5 At times, 
both the European Union and the United States have been criticized for 
their lack of commitment to the MENA democratization process. It is this 
evident lack of commitment that was on display during the beginning of 
2011.
It would appear that encouraging others to fight for the same freedoms 
Americans enjoy is not the priority that the U.S. Government sometimes 
makes it out to be.6 But if promoting the ideal of liberal democracy does 
not take precedence, what does? If liberal international relations theory 
fails to explain the words and deeds (or lack thereof) of the American 
Government in this situation, what overarching theoretical explanation 
can we find? Following a brief overview of U.S. energy security policy lit-
erature, I will address the recent MENA upheaval. This will be followed by 
a concise examination of U.S.-MENA energy relations. It will become 
clear that the importance of the MENA to U.S. energy security poses a 
complicated issue to be taken into account when considering democracy 
movements in the area, particularly with regard to potential regime 
changes. I will then argue that realism provides the best theoretical expla-
nation for U.S. reluctance to take a clear, pro-revolution policy stance 
concerning the recent North African uprisings. My focus is slightly more 
concentrated on North Africa because although reform movements were 
launched throughout the MENA, the most successful efforts have been 
limited to the North African nations of Egypt and Tunisia; Yemeni pro-
testors succeeded in unseating President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but the 
country is still experiencing chaos. Meanwhile, revolutionary attempts in 
Bahrain and Syria, and mild unrest in Saudi Arabia, have thus far proven 
notably unsuccessful. In closing, I will suggest key avenues for future 
research.
Energy Policy in the Literature: U.S. Insecurity
The United States is the world's third largest producer of crude oil (5.7 
million barrels per day, with an additional 4.6 million barrels per day in 
petroleum gains) but is the world's largest consumer (18.8 million barrels 
per day).7 More problematically for the long term, "the United States con-
sumes 25% of the world's oil, while possessing only 3% of the world's oil 
reserves."8 A topic of Presidential rhetoric spanning eight administra-
tions, fossil fuel energy security has never failed to capture attention in 
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one way or another (starting with Nixon in 1974 and continuing through 
the Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. 
Bush Administrations to the present day.9 Beginning with Nixon's desire 
to decrease dependency on foreign resources and most recently making 
headlines with Obama's warning that "cheap and easily accessible oil" is 
on the way out, the issue of energy security has served as both a political 
rallying call and a liability throughout the years. Notwithstanding charges 
of being "abstract, elusive, vague, inherently difficult and blurred" in 
nature, this subject has also grown increasingly salient in academic litera-
ture over the past decade.10 In fact, Haass attributes the decline of unipo-
larity in large part to United States energy policy. He argues that high 
levels of U.S. oil consumption and imports funnel financial resources to 
producer regions. Such financial capital would be better devoted to seek-
ing to reduce the influence wielded by fossil-fuel net exporters by increas-
ing our own energy independence and investing in sustainability.11
One of many explanations for the lack of real policy movement on the 
issue of foreign oil is that since economic assessments of the effects of 
energy security are generally vague and nebulous, policymakers fre-
quently lack guidance for effective policy creation and implementation. In 
an effort to mitigate this problem, Lefèvre uses an alternative approach 
which delineates between the price and physical availability factors on 
energy security. Lefèvre's findings, based on European case studies, 
reveal that oil market resource concentration is an important factor in the 
rise of the price component of energy security.12 This underlines the 
importance of the emphasis Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz place on secur-
ing stability in regions of oil resource concentration.13
Brown and Huntington note that increasing U.S. oil imports instead of 
trying to increase U.S. oil production expands the share of our energy 
supply derived from unstable regions, thus exacerbating oil price 
shocks.14 However, as a fungible resource in the integrated global oil mar-
ket, any upsurge in U.S. oil consumption (whether from domestic produc-
tion or imports) can aggravate economic losses related to oil supply 
disruptions. In an investigation of externalities quantifiable as "oil secu-
rity premiums" (economic losses connected to disturbances in oil sup-
plies), the authors found that estimated oil security premiums are actually 
relatively modest compared to projected increases in oil price itself. The 
study by Brown and Huntington, as well as individual work by Brown, 
stresses that oil consumption makes the United States vulnerable to secu-
rity externalities such as those described above, but that such economic 
concerns remain secondary to matters more directly related to the secu-
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rity of energy supply.15 These concerns include resource concentration 
outside the United States and the causes for current fluctuations in oil 
prices (such as government instability in producer regions).
Perceived threats to energy supplies are becoming increasingly salient in 
the energy security debate. Although in recent years leading industrial 
countries have integrated climate change concerns into their policy agen-
das, security of fossil fuel energy supply remains paramount; the United 
States consumes approximately two-three times the amount of its annual 
crude oil production. An ever-relevant concern in the United States, the 
attention devoted to energy security issues continues to grow at an 
unprecedented rate.16 Perceived or actual vulnerabilities, due to excessive 
reliance on particular sources or suppliers of energy, have led to the rise 
of policies designed to diversify energy supplies. Such policies include the 
expansion of U.S. oil company investment in Algeria, the creation of giant 
wind farms in Texas, and exploration of U.S. natural gas reserves in shale 
formations.17 However, although seen as more stable than some of its 
neighbors, Algeria remains vulnerable to the spread of regional unrest 
(see following "Jasmine in Bloom" section); domestic alternative energy 
production remains a nascent industry; and U.S. natural gas reserves 
have yet to be fully investigated. Despite favorable estimates of shale gas 
resources, uncertainty remains because the industry possesses the ability 
to fully predict neither "how resources in the ground translate into future 
yields" nor the true ecological repercussions of various extraction meth-
ods, including controversial hydraulic fracturing.18 For the short term at 
least, U.S. energy needs continue to rely heavily on oil and on the MENA. 
Even oil-producing states in the region from which the United States does 
not directly import oil can affect international prices by limiting the sup-
ply of oil (in 2010, national oil companies controlled approximately 55% 
of current production and 85% of proven reserves).19
Lacher and Kumetat recently dispelled illusions of excessive risk on the 
part of European nations investing in North Africa.20 However, their 
review neglected to consider the potential effects of mass reform move-
ments. "Insurgency" was considered as a subcategory of "terrorism," but 
this is hardly comparable to largely peaceful mass protest and overthrow-
ing of government. Lacher and Kumetat's article is also more geographi-
cally narrow in focus than this study, as they limit their investigation to 
North Africa. This paper then builds on their work by considering the 
effects of the current unrest in the MENA and gauging the potential con-
sequences for U.S. energy security.
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Jasmine in Bloom: The 2011 MENA Revolutions
The 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have garnered the 
appellations "Jasmine Revolution(s)" and "Arab Spring." The "Jasmine 
Revolution" label originally referred to the rise to power of President Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia in 1987. Media organizations, particularly 
those of Western origin, resurrected it recently to refer to the 2010–2011 
unrest. The Tunisian protest movement then spread throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa, taking the phrase "Jasmine Revolution" 
with it. However, many demonstrators prefer to refer to the movements 
by country name, or cities where early protests broke out. The term "Arab 
Spring" has also been spread by the media, particularly Western media 
organizations. This, and phrases like "Arab Awakening," indicate a newly 
pro-revolution, pro-Arab attitude, which challenges formerly shallow 
Western media portrayals of the region. These appellations for the MENA 
demonstrations and protest movements may be used interchangeably 
without real differentiation in meaning.21
Demonstrations originated in Tunisia, following the December 17, 2010 
self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a jobless graduate protesting the 
confiscation of his fruit and vegetables by the police. The continuation of 
protests following this initial expression of anger in Tunisia, considered a 
stable nation in the region, surprised many observers. By January 9, 
between eleven and twenty deaths had been reported, following clashes 
between protestors and police. Riots broke out as demonstrators attacked 
public offices and burned cars. Two days earlier, rioting had taken place 
in neighboring Algeria over sharp increases in food prices. Although 
police dealt harshly with demonstrators, using teargas and batons, Alge-
rian Trade Minister Mustapha Benbada promised imminent price reduc-
tions in edible staples, hoping this would mitigate the situation.22
Demonstrators refused to be suppressed in Tunisia. The uprising gained 
such strength that on January 14 Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben 
Ali fled to Saudi Arabia. By this time the death toll had reached an esti-
mated 200 people. U.S. President Barack Obama, apparently caught off-
guard by the success of the Tunisian revolution, delivered a post-hoc 
statement lauding the "courage and dignity of the Tunisian people."23 
Algerian rioting also continued, although without marked success. Two 
Algerian men apparently set themselves on fire during this time span in 
what appeared to be copy-cat suicide attempts of the Tunisian December 
self-immolation that first sparked regional protests. Libyan leader Muam-
mar Gaddafi condemned the Tunisian revolution, while concern mounted 
among regional and Western leaders about the possibility of a domino 
effect in the MENA. On January 17, a man in Cairo set himself on fire, 
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apparently in protest against economic conditions. Near the end of the 
month, Yemen also made headlines as demonstrations, initially inspired 
by Tunisia then by the arrest of a well-known female Islamic activist, 
became more impassioned. Riot police used water cannons to disperse 
protestors; President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to defuse tensions by 
raising salaries of state employees, halving income taxes, and ordering his 
ministers to control prices.24
Also, during the end of January, unrest spread to Amman, Jordan. Dem-
onstrators demanded political and economic reform. However, during the 
last six days of January, Western media attention was fixated on mass 
demonstrations in Egypt. Nationwide protests erupted with dissatisfied 
citizens calling for the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. By Febru-
ary 1, Mubarak attempted to placate protestors by promising to step down 
at the next election. This attempt failed, as did an effort to intimidate 
demonstrators using regime-orchestrated mob violence. Demonstrations 
also continued in Yemen, despite Saleh's offer to step down in 2013. The 
first week of February saw continued mass demonstrations in Egypt, in 
spite of renewed government efforts to wheel and deal its way out of the 
trouble. Mubarak finally stepped down on February 11 after eighteen days 
of mass protest. The following day, Algerian police beat back protestors in 
Algiers. Protests also resumed in Yemen, and appeared in Bahrain and 
Iran. Bahraini riot police fired teargas and rubber bullets at demonstra-
tors during the first mass protests in a wealthy Gulf state. By the end of 
February, protests and accompanying riots had spread to many cities in 
Morocco, continued in Yemen and Egypt, reappeared in Tunisia, Bahrain, 
and Jordan, and also appeared in Iraq.25
Region-wide protests, and Western attention to them, eased at the begin-
ning of the month of March as Libya took over the headlines. Mid-March 
saw Yemeni protests pick up pace once more; the banning of protests in 
Saudi Arabia (following street demonstrations by minority Shia groups); 
and Saudi support for the Bahraini regime in putting down protests that 
had almost overwhelmed riot police. Algeria moved to stave off additional 
unrest by providing pay raises to more government employees. Syrian 
security forces killed protestors in Daraa, while Saleh began to lose his 
grip on the Yemeni population. By March 21, eleven top Yemeni military 
commanders had resigned. Confrontations in Jordan and Bahrain also 
continued through the end of March. April saw continued unrest through-
out MENA, with regime crackdowns and plainclothes security forces fir-
ing on civilians in Yemen; troops firing on and killing protestors in Syria; 
a Jordanian man setting himself on fire; pressure from Egyptian protest-
ors to prosecute Mubarak; and systematic attacks by Bahraini forces 
against medical personnel assisting injured protestors. By the end of 
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April, the Syrian Government had sent tanks and troops into towns and 
villages in a massive crackdown; Yemeni ruler Saleh had promised to step 
down, but protestors continued to demonstrate over what was seen as a 
repugnant immunity deal negotiated with the Saudi-dominated Gulf 
Cooperation Council.26
Over a year later, the protests have only resulted in the resignation of 
three heads of state: Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt, and after a much longer process, Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. 
Various other leaders have announced their intentions not to seek reelec-
tion after their current terms, including the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki. Jordanian protests did result in the resignation of the govern-
ment, but the breadth and depth of reforms is debated; in May of 2012, 
many observers feared the reform process had been stalled indefinitely.27 
The Obama Administration's overall response to the MENA revolutions 
has been remarkable for its underwhelming nature. Apparently caught 
flatfooted by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions (and supporting the 
semi-liberal regimes of "our guys"); seeming to try not to step on the 
Saudi royals' toes with regard to the Saudi Arabian and Bahraini demon-
strations; reluctant to criticize the King of Jordan; and failing to express 
support or concern for the Syrian and Yemeni protestors until govern-
ment crackdowns became extreme, the American Government has 
appeared to be making more of an effort not to support the revolutions 
than to express solidarity with the revolutionaries.28 The perennial U.S. 
need for oil explains this reserve.
U.S. Energy Security: The MENA Connection
A number of causes can result in energy price fluctuation, including cur-
rent energy supply and demand conditions, financial market conditions, 
and expectations concerning future supply and demand. Due to the fungi-
bility of oil, and the integration of global hydrocarbon markets, what 
takes place in the MENA is of paramount concern to the United States.29 
The North African region alone holds approximately 4.5% of the world's 
oil and 4.4% of the world's proven gas reserves.30 Although the U.S. pro-
cures a greater amount of its oil from Canada than from anywhere else, 
disruptions in the MENA both directly and indirectly affect U.S. oil 
import capabilities. Direct effects include increased competition with 
Europe (the largest hydrocarbon importer from the MENA area) for 
MENA resources, while indirect effects include the destabilization of glo-
bal hydrocarbon markets (e.g., through speculation).
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Once the protests began in Tunisia, Brent crude oil prices increased by 
nearly $20 per barrel to $113 per barrel on March 8, 2011, at which point 
unrest had spread through a number of MENA countries.31 (The price for 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude, the benchmark most often cited in 
the United States, did not increase as dramatically due to a variety of fac-
tors, including greater integration between the market for Brent.) With 
the launch of NATO Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya (on March 19), 
prices rose even more dramatically to $125. While oil futures had already 
been rising during the fourth quarter of 2010, largely as a result of the glo-
bal economic recovery and accompanying increase in oil demand, unrest 
in the MENA contributed to higher prices. This is because of threats to the 
oil supply from and oil transportation through the region, as well as lower 
production having resulted from the protests. Furthermore, there 
remained concern (indeed, there remains concern, albeit now dimin-
ished) that more pronounced unrest may spread to the region's larger 
producers.32
"The MENA region includes some of the world's largest oil exporting 
countries and most important shipping chokepoints."33 In total, the 
region's oil exports equal approximately 40% of global oil trade. Approxi-
mately 45% of the petroleum used in the United States is imported. 52% 
of that comes from the Western hemisphere, but 42% of the remainder 
comes from the Persian Gulf and Africa (although 10% is from Nigeria, 
largely unaffected by the MENA protests).34 The EIA lists three shipping 
chokepoints in the MENA alone (the Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the 
Strait of Hormuz), which also impact international oil transport and 
availability.35 Egyptian protests in January and February highlighted the 
possibility of disruptions to oil and natural gas transport between the Red 
Sea and the Mediterranean. Turmoil in Libya, a larger oil exporter than 
Egypt, and Bahrain also increased concern in the oil markets, as a number 
of U.S. companies are invested in Libya's oil production. Although Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait announced they would increase production to com-
pensate for any loss from the Libyan disruption, some of the extra Saudi 
oil is of lower quality than Libyan crude, which makes Saudi oil an imper-
fect substitute for lost Libyan production. Some European refineries are 
not equipped to process lower quality crudes, which may result in damag-
ing market competition for petroleum from Nigeria (which ranks seventh 
among U.S. oil suppliers) and Azerbaijan.
The United States' biggest concern, however, remains the possibility of 
the revolutionary movement spreading to other, larger petroleum produc-
ers in the region—specifically Saudi Arabia, which is the world's second-
largest producer (behind Russia). According to the Congressional 
Research Service, "[i]n addition to its current output, as of the end of 
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2010, Saudi Arabia also held about 80% of the world's spare oil produc-
tion capacity—capacity that is now being used to offset supply disruptions 
elsewhere."36 If the Arab Spring decided to truly bloom in Saudi Arabia, 
market fears could potentially drive prices far higher. Finally, the security 
situation in the Strait of Hormuz is also of concern. The Strait, located 
between Iran and Oman, is used as a route for a third of global oil trans-
port—any interruption could result in higher oil prices.37
Realism: Strategic Concerns over Democratic Ideals
Realism, which emphasizes the propensity for conflict between states and 
their desire to maximize self-interest in the world system, provides us 
with a clear and parsimonious theoretical explanation for the behavior of 
the United States Government with regard to the recent MENA upris-
ings.38 Structural realism evaluates the world politics at the system level. 
The unit of analysis is the state. The theory views international relations 
as a competition for power between self-interested states, leading to a 
generally pessimistic outlook on "the prospects for eliminating conflict 
and war."39 It may be notable, then, that the United States has not been 
more vocal in its disapproval of the democratic movements in the Mid-
East. This can be attributed either to the conflict between realism and 
democratic ideals (like people, states do not always act out of purely ratio-
nal self-interest) or to the fact that the MENA revolutions did not spread 
to larger oil producers in the area.40
Even more germane to our particular inquiry, structural realism empha-
sizes the need for each state to focus on its own survival in an anarchic 
world system. Waltz points out that states' actions can be explained by 
examining the constraints under which they operate in international com-
petition. Structural realism emphasizes that not merely military might, 
but also energy security, is cause for concern, particularly for the United 
States.41 States seek, at a minimum, their own survival, but at a maxi-
mum, universal domination. U.S. desire for, at the very least, our own 
energy security, is a clear and rational cause of recent reluctance to sup-
port grass-roots democracy. The preference for keeping "our guys" in 
power is self-evident.42
Wohlforth explains this with parsimony rivaling that of realist theory 
itself. Realism is based on three key assumptions: groupism, egoism, and 
power-centrism. Groupism dictates that people need group solidarity to 
survive above subsistence level. In the modern world, the group level is 
the state. Egoism holds that self-interest will inevitably win out over 
altruism; power-centrism holds that power is the "fundamental feature of 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5  No. 3
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss3/6
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.3.3</p>The 2011 MENA Revolutions: A Study in U.S. Energy (In)Security
43
politics."43 An important element of power is control of resources—such 
as energy. Key logical implications of these assumptions for our case 
study are as follows: the state, and nationalism, will be a key feature of 
politics; and state strategic interests will "trump any putatively universal 
morality and ethics."44 Indeed, "realism suggests skepticism about the 
ability of even the wisest states to promote democracy beyond their own 
borders."45
Likewise, in keeping with the defensive realist theory of proponents such 
as Waltz, the United States has not come to the rescue of the autocrats 
removed from office as a result of the Arab Spring movement. While the 
United States will undoubtedly face a complicated policy situation in the 
Middle East as new regimes come to power, attempting to maximize its 
own power in the region by blatantly manipulating the situation and aid-
ing in the suppression of mass protests would be unwise—the interna-
tional system would react unfavorably.46
Conclusion: Suggestions for Future Research
This paper has examined the recent Arab Spring in the Middle East and 
North Africa and the American energy concerns pertinent to it. The key 
puzzle was how to explain the lack of meaningful United States rhetoric in 
support of the MENA reform movement. It was a particularly curious 
conundrum given the freedoms on which our own country was founded. 
The evaluation of the U.S. energy security situation and the U.S. MENA 
relations demonstrated a connection between American energy security 
concerns and American foreign relations in the MENA. At one point in the 
beginning of 2011, oil prices jumped approximately eight percent in just a 
few days due to fears that the chaos in Egypt would affect the two million 
barrels per day that pass through the Suez Canal and the adjacent oil 
pipeline. This was clearly of grave concern to American policymakers and 
energy analysts.
This paper employed the theoretical approach of structural realism to fur-
ther clarify and explain how energy security interests translated into 
American policy toward the MENA during these historic revolutionary 
efforts. As one of the most well-known theories of international relations, 
structural realism offers a framework for evaluating the competing goals 
of U.S. foreign policy and American democratic values. It provides a hier-
archy of priorities. This hierarchy clearly shows that energy security is of 
great importance in the larger structure of national security.
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This paper closes with some suggestions for future research. Scholars and 
policymakers should investigate the special case of Libya. A study of U.S. 
participation in the NATO intervention in Libya has the potential to pro-
vide additional clarification to this work on the U.S. response to the 
regional revolutions overall. Analysts have suggested contradicting expla-
nations as to whether aiding the Libyan rebels is for altruistic, humanitar-
ian reasons, or whether it is a bid to more quickly restore stability to an 
important producer—action for strategic purposes this time, instead of 
inaction.47 Scholars have now begun to address U.S. and NATO participa-
tion in the Libyan revolution, but more work needs to be done. Research 
clarifying America's foreign policy on Libya would contribute greatly to 
the field. Additionally, the Syrian situation becomes more desperate by 
the day. Academic analysis of the United States' reluctance to intervene 
militarily in this matter would provide a valuable contribution to under-
standing the role that energy (in)security and democratic values play in 
American foreign policy (in)action.
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